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CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF UTAH

December 6, 1989

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

State v. David J. Hunt, Case No. 880386-CA

Dear Mr. Butler:
The respondent, State of Utah, hereby waives the right
to file a Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
in the above-referenced case pursuant to Rule 47(d), Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court. This waiver does not constitute a
stipulation that the petition should be granted, but rather, it
is respondent's position that the petition should be denied based
upon the legal analysis contained in the Brief of Respondent and
the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which are attached to
this letter. In the event that the Court deems an additional
response by the State necessary to its determination, a Brief in
Opposition will be provided.
Thank you for your consideration.
Very truly yours,

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
DRL:bks
cc:

Randine R. Salerno
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State of Utah,

• C" • " • < * * * Court

Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Case No. 880386-CA
David J. Hunt,
Defendant and Appellant.

Second District, Weber County
Honorable David E. Roth
Attorneys:

Randine R. Salerno, Ogden, for Appellant,
R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen,
Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Billings.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant David J. Hunt appeals from a bench trial conviction
for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
for value. Defendant argues on appeal that the failure of the
county attorney to sign the application for an intercept order
invalidated the application, and therefore, the evidence obtained
pursuant to the order should be suppressed. We affirm.
FACTS
On May 23, 1986, Weber County Attorney Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
filed an application for an order to intercept wire
communications from Hunt's residence. The application was
supported by an affidavit signed by Sergeant Glen Warner, naming
defendant as the main person involved in a drug organization that
purchases and transports cocaine to suppliers along the Wasatch
Front. Hughes inadvertently failed to sign the application. The
omission was not initially noticed and Judge Wahlquist signed the

order authorizing interception of defendant's wire
communications from May 29, 1986 through June 28, 1986. During
that month, however, defendant left Salt Lake City and lived in
California.
On June 27, 1986, Deputy Weber County Attorney William F.
Daines applied for an extension of the intercept order.
Attached to the application was an affidavit submitted by
Sergeant Warner setting forth the results of the first
intercept. Judge Wahlquist granted a thirty-day extension,
from June 28, 1986, through July 27, 1986.
On July 26, 1986, Daines applied for a second extension of
the intercept order from July 27, 1986 through August 3, 1986.
While preparing that application, Daines discovered the
omission of Hughes's signature on the original application.
Hughes filed a motion nunc pro tunc to execute the original
application. Judge Wahlquist granted the nunc pro tunc order
making the execution of the original application effective May
23, 1986, and signed the order for the second extension of the
intercept. The interception of defendant's wire communications
ceased on August 3, 1986.
Based on the information gathered from the interception of
defendant's wire communications, the police learned that a
large drug transaction was about to take place between
defendant and another person in Vista, California. On August
5, 1986, defendant placed a call to the other person and
immediately left for California. Detectives in California
informed the Utah police of defendant's arrival at the Vista
residence.
On August 8, 1986, defendant drove back to Utah followed by
four police cars and a police helicopter. The police obtained
a search warrant for defendant's home and vehicles and on
August 9, 1986, conducted a search. Thirty-four items of
personal property were seized including one pound of cocaine,
scales, scale weights, and a cocaine screen. Defendant was
arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with the intent
to distribute for value.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress all evidence
seized as a result of the search of his home and vehicles
challenging the sufficiency of the probable cause statements in
support of the search warrant. The motion was denied and a
bench trial was held. Defendant's trial counsel objected at
trial to the admission of any evidence obtained as a result of
the intercept orders because they were not properly executed.
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The judge ruled that the omission of the signature was not
fatal to the order and that the nunc pro tunc order remedied
any error. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to prison.
On May 29, 1988, Hughes filed a belated affidavit
establishing his authorization of the application for the
intercept order and his special designation of Daines as being
"duly authorized, " pursi lant to Tifah Code Ann § 77-23a-8
(1982) .
Defendant argues on appeal that the failure of the county
attorney to sign the original application for the intercept
order could not be remedied nunc pro tunc and that the order
purported to authorize interception for a period in excess of
that permitted by section 77-23a-10 (1982). Defendant also
argues that the deputy county attorney was not "specially
designated" pursuant to section 77-23a-8 to apply for the
extensions. Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance because these objections were
not timely made.
Al JTHOR1Z A:I " I ON FC i:: 1 1 1NTERCEPT ORDER
Title 111 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to -2520, provides the framework for
the Utah Interception of Communications Act, Utah Code A n n .
§§ 77-23a-l to -16 (Sui I , 1 989) ] The Utah Act, as well as
its federal counterpart, set forth the procedure for
authorizing and approving the interception of wire
communications. The version of section 77-23a 8, which was in
effect at the time of trial, authorized the county attorney or
any deputy county attorney, "specially designated" by the
county attorney, to authorize an application for an intercept
o r d e r . 2 Utah Code A n n . § 77-23a-10(l) (1982) requires that
an application for an intercept order be in writing:
1. Since the time of trial in this matter, the Utah Interception
of Communications Act was amended by the legislature in both 1988
and 1989.
2. I he 1989 amendment eliminated the "special designation"
requirement, Coi inty a11orneys a re no longer required to
"specially designate" deputy county attorneys to authorize
applications for wire interceptions. The 1989 amendment now
authorizes any depi lty coin ity attorney to ai ithorize wire
communications interceptions without first obtaining county
attorney approval. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8(l) (Supp. 1 9 8 9 ) .

o

Each application for an order authorizing
or approving the interception of wire or
oral communication shall be made in
writing upon oath or affirmation to a
judge of competent jurisdiction, and shall
state the applicant's authority to make
the application . . • . 3
Defendant does not take issue with whether the application
properly complied with the substantive requirements of section
77-23a-10(l), but claims that the omission of the county
attorney's signature invalidated the application.
Federal case law holds that personal approval, or approval in
fact, by the Attorney General of an application for an intercept
order, overcomes facial insufficiencies because of incorrect
signatures or the misidentification of the authorizing attorney
general.4 The test is whether the deficiencies are of the type
which "require suppression where there is failure to satisfy any
of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the
employment of this extraordinary investigative device." United
States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting
United States v. Giondeno, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)).
3. The 1988 amendment to section 77-23a-10(l) inserted
"electronic" following "wire" throughout the entire section.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10 (Supp. 1988). The legislature, in
1989, also amended section 77-23a-10 but none of those changes
affect this appeal.
4. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States
v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 859 (1st Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("The
absence of a compelling signature on a critical document can be
remedied by proof of actual authority."); United States v.
Lawson, 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Thomas,
508 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975);
United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1974)
(misidentifying assistant attorney general as authorizing person
does not render interceptions unlawful); United States v. Cox,
462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bowdach, 366 F.
Supp. 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1973); and United States v. Schullo, 363 F.
Supp. 246, 253 (D. Minn. 1973) ("[0]nce the Attorney General
himself has approved an application for electronic surveillance,
further ministerial acts are unimportant.").
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The United States Supreme Court, in United States v.
Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974), decided whether it was appropriate
to suppress evidence where statutory application procedures for
an intercept order were not fully satisfied. In Chavez, the
application and court order incorrectly identified the
Assistant Attorney General as the authorizing official.
Despite this procedural violation, the Supreme Court determined
that the Attorney General had in fact authorized the
application. The Court held that since there was not a claim
of any constitutional infirmity arising from the defect, "it
does not follow that because of this deficiency in reporting,
evidence obtained pursuant to the order may not be used at a
trial of respondents." I£. at 570. See also United States v.
Bowdach, 366 F. Suppr at 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (congressional
scheme not violated where deputy attorney general signed order
when attorney general had in fact approved the order). The
Court distinguished its holding in Giordano by stating, "we did
not go so far as to suggest that every failure to comply with
any requirement provided in Title III would frender the
interception of wire or oral communications unlawful.•"
Chavez, 416 U.S. at 574-75.
In determining whether technical violations rise to the
level of constitutional infirmities, consideration of the
rationale behind the procedural requirements in the Utah Act is
important. Section 2518 of Title III, comparable to section
77-23a-10 of the Utah Act, "was designed to affix the lines of
responsibility as a corollary to promoting a uniform policy in
wire interception." Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. at 1373.
"[A]lthough considerations of centralization and uniformity of
decision-making are adjuncts to the protection of privacy,
those considerations do not reach the level of constitutional
status." I&. The purpose behind section 2516 of Title III,
comparable to section 77-23a-8, requiring identification of the
authorizing official in the application, "facilitates the
court's ability to conclude that the application has been
properly approved," and also fixes responsibility for the
source of preliminary approval. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 575.
Defendant argues that to require anything less than a sworn
writing would effectively destroy the requirement of
authorization and provide a convenient means to escape public
accountability. However, there was ample evidence to show that
Hughes did in fact approve the application for the intercept
order, and is clearly accountable for such authorization. The
application identified Hughes numerous times as the one
authorizing the application and he submitted an affidavit
attesting to the fact that he approved the applications. By

inadvertently omitting his signature# Hughes did not compromise
the privacy of wire and oral communications as provided in
section 77-23a-2 (1982).
•SPECIALLY DESIGNATED" DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
Defendant contends that the applications for extensions of
time for the interceptions were not authorized by a "deputy
county attorney specially designated by the county attorney" in
accordance with section 77-23a-8 (1982):
[A]ny county attorney or any deputy county
attorney specially designated by the
county attorney, may authorize an
application to a Utah State district court
judge of competent jurisdiction for, and
the judge may grant . . • an order
authorizing or approving the interception
of a wire or oral communication . . . .
(emphasis added.)5
This issue is raised for the first time on appeal and "[i]n
the absence of exceptional circumstances, [Utah appellate
courts have] long refused to review matters raised for the
first time on appeal where no timely and proper objection was
made in the trial court." State v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115, 117
(Utah 1987). Even if this issue had been raised below, the
application is, nevertheless, valid. Defendant is merely
making a semantic distinction between "specially designated"
and "duly authorized." The application for the extension
stated that Deputy County Attorney William F. Daines is "duly
5. The amended portion of section 77-23a-8 currently appears as
follows:
The attorney general of the state or any
assistant attorney general, or any county
attorney or deputy county attorney may
authorize an application to a judge of
competent jurisdiction for an order for an
interception of wire, electronic, or oral
communications. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8 (Supp. 1989).

880386-CA

6

authorized by Donald C. Hughes, Weber County Attorney, to make
this application.- In light of the foregoing analysis, this
distinction is nteritless.
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant finally claims ineffective assistance of
counsel. In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the
defendant's burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but
for counsel's error." State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah
1985). See also Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Failure to show either deficient performance or
resulting prejudice will defeat a claim of ineffective
counsel. Geary, 707 P.2d at 646. The Utah Supreme Court
recently applied the Strickland test in State v. Archuleta, 747
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987):
Before this Court will consider whether
specific conduct falls below the required
standard of objective reasonableness, the
person arguing ineffective assistance must
show that the conduct prejudiced his case.
. . . (citations omitted). In order to
prove prejudice to his case, "defendant
must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." I£. at 1023 (quoting
g£rj£klan'i, 466 U.S. at 694).
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective
for the following reasons: (1) he failed to file a timely
motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence; (2) he
failed to object to the sufficiency of the probable cause
statement in support of the search warrant; (3) he failed to
object to the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the
intercept order; and (4) he failed to articulate and support
his objection to certain evidence.
Defendant's first two claims are inconsistent with the
trial record as it appears before us. Trial counsel filed a
timely motion to suppress on the ground that the probable cause
statement was insufficient to support the search warrant. At
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trial, counsel also objected, at length, to the sufficiency of
the probable cause statement. Both the motion and the
objections were denied. We defer to trial counselfs
professional judgment and trial strategy in not pursuing this
line of objection. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023
(Utah 1987). "Decisions as to what witnesses to call, what
objections to make, and, by and large, what defenses to
interpose, are generally left to the professional judgment of
counsel." State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
We are not persuaded that defendants trial counsel was
ineffective. Even if all of defendants claims were true, we
are not persuaded that the outcome would have been different.
The governing legal standard plays a
critical role in defining the question to
be asked in assessing the prejudice from
counsel's errors. When a defendant
challenges a conviction, the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the fact finder
would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt.
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 695.
The trial court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The evidence amply supports this finding.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge
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Attorney General
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH#

1

Plaintiff-Respondent, it
V.

1

DAVID J. HUNT,

I\

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 880386-CA

Category No. 2

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Possession of a
Controlled Substance with the Intent to Distribute for Value, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 5 58-37-B
(1986), in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Weber
County.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the County Attorney's authorization of an

application for an wiretap need not be a signed writing.
2.

Whether the Deputy County Attorney was duly

authorited to apply for a wiretap extension order where the
application stated he was "duly authorited?"
3.

Whether Utah Code Ann. SS 77-23a-7 and 77-23a-

10(10) (1982) mandate suppression of evidence obtained as a
result of execution of a search warrant based upon information
obtained from a telecomrounicator intercept order, which order
contained a technical defect?

2.

Whether defendant was denied his right to effective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and section 12, article I of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. f 77-23a-7. Evidence •
Exclusionary Rule.
When any wire, electronic, or oral
communication has been intercepted, no part
of the contents of the communication and no
evidence derived from it may be received in
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory
body, legislative committee, or other
authority of the state, or a political
subdivision of the state, if the disclosure
of that information would be in violation of
this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. f 77-23a-8. Court order to
authorise or approve interception ••
Procedure.
The attorney general of the state, or any
assistant attorney general specifically
designated by the attorney general or any
county attorney or any deputy county attorney
specially designated by the county attorney,
&ay authorize an application to a judge of
competent jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. f 77-23a-10.
(1) Each application for an order
authorising or approving the interception of
a wire, electronic, or oral communication
shall be made in writing upon oath or
affirmation to a judge of competent
jurisdiction, and shall state the applicant's
authority to make the application. . . •
Utah Code Ann. f 77-23a-10(5)a.
(5)(a) An order entered under this chapter
may not authorise or approve the interception
of any wire, electronic, or oral
communication for any period longer than is

•2-

necessary to achieve the objective of the
authorisation, nor In any event longer than
30 days. The 30 day period begins on the day
the investigative or law enforcement officer
first begins to conduct an interception under
the order, or ten days after the order is
entered, whichever is earlier.
Utah Code Ann. f 77-23-10(5)b.
(b) Extensions of an order may be granted,
but only upon application for an extension
made under Subsection (1), and if the court
makes the findings required by Subsection
(2). The period of extension may be no
longer than the authorizing judge deems
necessary to achieve the purposes for which
it was granted, but in not event for longer
than 30 days.
Utah Code Ann. f 77-23-10(10)(a).
(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial,
hearing, or proceeding in or before any
court, department, officer, agency,
regulatory body, or other authority of the
United States, Utah, or a political
subdivision, may move to suppress the
contents of any intercepted wire, electronic,
or oral communication, or evidence derived
from any of them, on the grounds that!
(i) the communication was unlawfully
intercepted,
(il) the order of authorisation or
approval under which it was intercepted
is insufficient on its face; or
(Hi) the interception was not made in
conformity with the order of
authorization or approval.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David J. Hunt, was charged with Possession
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. $ 58-37-8
(1986)*

Defendant was convicted as charged after a bench trial

held February 19-20, 1987, in the Second Judicial District Court,
in and for Weber County, the Honorable David E. Roth, Judge,

presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by Judge Roth on March 16,

1987f to a term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 23, 1986, Don Hughes, the Weber County Attorney,
filed an application for an order to intercept wire
communications of defendant's residence.
Addendum pages 11*14.)

(See Br. of App.

Attached to and incorporated into the

application was an affidavit signed by Glen M. Warner, Sergeant
of the Ogden City Police Department Narcotics Division, under
oath and affirmation to John F. Wahlqui6t, a judge in the Second
Judicial District.

(See Brief of App. Addendum pages 15-42.)

The affidavit named defendant as the main person involved in a
drug organization that purchases and transports cocaine to
various other suppliers along the Wasatch Front.

(See Brief of

App. Addendum page 27.)
Judge Wahlquist signed an Ex«parte Order authorizing
the interception of defendant's write communications from May 29,
1986 to June 28, 1986.
36).

(See Br. of App. Addendum pages 43-48; T.

At that time, the absence of Mr. Hughes' signature on the

application was not noticed, though the unsigned writing was part
of the file with Mr. Hughes' name repeated throughout.

(See Br.

of App. Addendum pages 11*14; T. 36.)
On June 27, 1986, an application for an Ex-parte Order
authorising the Extension of the intercept was made by William F.
Due to the volume of relevant documents, respondent will refer
to the Addendum of the Brief of Appellant rather than duplicating
the documents.
•4-

Daines, Deputy Weber County Attorney.
pages 51*54.)

(See Br. of App. Addendum

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-8 (1980), the

application Identified Hr. Daines as being "duly authorised" to
pake the application.

(See Brief of App. Addendum page 51.)

Attached to an incorporated into the application was an affidavit
submitted by Sergeant Warner setting forth the results of the
first intercept.

(See Br. of App. Addendum pages 55-59.)

Defendant, however, had left town for much of June, thereby
negating much of the intercept period allowed in the first order.
(See Br. of App. Addendum page 56; T. 42.)

Consequently, Judge

Wahlquist approved the extension of the intercept between June
28, 1986 and July 27, 1986.

(See Br. of App. Addendum page 62.)

On July 26, 1986, Mr. Daines applied for another
extension of the wiretap.

(See Br. of App. Addendum page 69.)

During preparation to apply for this final extension, it was
learned that Mr. Hughes had failed to sign the original
application for an intercept (T. 40). Thereafter, Mr. Hughes
filed a Hunc Pro Tunc Order remedying the clerical defect.

(See

Br. of App. Addendum pages 49-50; T. 46.) The Nunc Pro Tunc
Order corrected the oversight before the search of defendant's
house and before his arrest (T. 37). Judge Wahlquist granted the
extension of the intercept for seven more days operating from
July 27, 1986 to August 3, 1986.

(See Br. of App. Addendum page

79.) The interception of defendant's wire communications ceased
on August 3, 1986, in compliance with the Intercept Order (T. 32,
45).

A pen register, however, continued to operate on

defendant's phone (T. 63)*

Based upon information accumulated by three Intercept
Orders on defendant's phone, it appeared that a large drug
transaction was about to occur between defendant a woman who
lived in Vista, California.

(See Br. of App. Addendum page 92.)

On August 5, 1986, after calling the Vista number, defendant left
suddenly for California (T. 64). Detectives Shorten and Cottom,
who were on surveillance at the Vista residence, informed the
Utah police that defendant arrived at the residence on August 6,
1986 (T. 65, 144, 165).
During defendant's stay in California, Brent West,
Circuit Court Judge, received an affidavit in support of a search
warrant based upon information obtained from the intercept on
defendant's phone.

(See Br. of App. Addendum pages 87, 91-94.)

Finding probable cause to believe that defendant was involved in
criminal activity, Judge Vest Issued a search warrant for the
defendant's home and automobiles.

(See Br. of App. Addendum

pages 86-94; T. 27.)
On the night of August 8, 1986, defendant began driving
back to Utah (T. 149-50, 170). Defendant was followed by four
police cars and one helicopter (T. 234). Defendant arrived at
his home in Utah on the morning of August 9, 1986 (T. €8). On or
about August 9, 1986, the search warrant was executed on
defendant's house and vehicles.
18-89.)

(See Br. of App. Addendum pages

Thirty-four items of personal property were seised

pursuant to the warrant including a pound of cocaine, set scales,
scale weights, and a coVe screen used to measure cocaine.
Br. of App. Addendum pages 88-89.)

(See

Defendant was arrested and

charged with Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute for
Value (T. 255).
On February 17, 1987, Mr. Don Sharp, counsel for
defendant, filed a notion to suppress all evidence seised as a
result of the search of defendant's home and vehicles (R. 39-40).
The notion to suppress primarily challenged the sufficiency of
the probable cause statements in support of the search warrant
(R. 40).
On February 19, 1987, trial was held before the
Honorable David E. Roth, Judge of the Second Judicial District
Court, sitting without a jury (R. 256). During trial, Mr. Sharp
objected to the admission of any evidence obtained aB a result of
the Intercept Orders because Mr. Hughes had not signed the
original order (T. 37). He also raised the issue of the validity
of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order (T. 37). Judge Roth denied
defendant's motion finding that the failure to timely sign the
Application was not fatal to the warrant (T. 41).
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled
substance with the Intent to Distribute for Value (T. 293).
Defendant was sentenced to serve a term in the Utah State Prison
of not less than one nor more than fifteen years (T. 156). On
Kay 29, 1988, Don Hughes filed an affidavit establishing his
authorisation of the application for the intercept and his
special designation of Mr. William Daines to authorise the
extensions (R. 251-52).

Defendant's direct appeal was dismissed

on June 1, 1987 for failure to prosecute (R. 163). After a
Habeas Corpus action in the Third Judicial District Court, the

matter was remitted back to Judge Roth for re-sentencing to allow
defendant to pursue his right to appeal (R. 167-71).

Defendant's

Notice of Appeal was filed June 6, 1988f and he was released from
the Utah State Prison following Judge Roth's approval of a
Certificate of Probable Cause (R. 231, 233).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. $ 77-23a-8 (1982) does not require the
County Attorney's signature to authorize or specially designate a
deputy county attorney to authorize an application for a wiretap.
In any event, the wiretap application the Nunc Pro Tunc Order,
and the County Attorney's Affidavit are establish that the
wiretap application was in fact authorised by the County
Attorney.
The application for extension of the wiretap order
specifically stated that the Deputy County Attorney was "duly
authorised" to file the pleading.
The Court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to the wiretap where the
wiretap orders were properly authorised.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S AUTHORIZATION rOR A
WIRETAP NEED NOT BE A SIGNED WRITING
Defendant argues that the original order permitting
Interception of defendant's wire and oral communication was
Invalid because it was not properly authorised by the County
Attorney.

Defendant attributes the invalid authorisation to the

County Attorney's failure to sign the wiretap application.

•8

Defendant'* claim should be dismissed as It is without legal
foundation.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. SS 2510-2520, provides the framework from
which the Utah Interception Communications Act, (hereinafter the
Utah Act), Utah Code Ann. $ 77-23a-l (1982), et. aeq. was based.
The Utah Act, along with it federal counterpart, sets forth the
procedure for obtaining judicial approval of the interception of
wire communcations which aids in the investigation of specified
serious offenses.

Specifically, S 77-23a~8, of the Utah Act,

governs county attorney applications for interception as follows:
Any county attorney or any deputy county
attorney specially designated by the county
attorney, may authorize an application to
Utah State district court judge of competent
jurisdiction. . .
On its face, this Utah statute does not require the
authorization to be in writing or to be aigned.

Additionally, a

scan of federal wiretap cases indicates that personal approval,
not written approval, by the county attorney is all that is
required to comply with the authorization requirement of Title
211.
For instance, in State v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974),
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a wiretap issued
pursuant to Title III where the statutory procedures of
authorization had not been fully satisfied as required by the
Title.

Specifically, SS 2518(4)(a) and 2518(4)(d) of Title III

were violated because the wiretap order misidentlfled the officer
who had authorised the wiretap orders. Consequently, defendant

sought to suppress evidence that had been obtained under two
wiretap orders alleging that a valid authorization for the
wiretap orders had not occurred.

Despite the procedural

violation, the Supreme Court held that since the Attorney General
had in fact authorized the application, a valid authorization had
occurred and thus, Title III did not mandate suppression.

The

essence of the Court's holding was that proof of actual authority
is all that is required to validate an authorization for an
2
application of a wiretap.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v.
Scully, 546 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 970
(1976), thereafter considered a claim that a Title III
authorization of an application for a wiretap mandated a signed
writing.

In its decision, the Ninth Circuit explained Chavez and

decided the case contrary to the defendant's claim:
Appellants contend that the application .
. . was not properly approved by the Attorney
General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
2516(1), as required. In this case, there
were documents demonstrating that the
Attorney General personally approved of the .
. . application, although he did not do so in
writing. Under United States v. Chavez, 416
U.S. 562, 94 S. Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380
(1974), personal approval is all that is
required to comply with section 2516(1). The
statute does not require a written approval.
Scully, 546 F.2d at 261.
In United States v. Thomas, 508 r.2d 1200 (8th Cir.
**75), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975), the Eighth Circuit

Consistent with its holding, the Chavez Court also excluded a
wiretape because it had not been in fact authorized by the
Attorney Geneal. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 754*55.

Court of Appeals held that the procedures followed by the Justice
Department complied with the wiretap authoritation requirements
of Title III.

In this case, the defendant challenged the

authoritation for a wiretap because the wiretap application was
•signed by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General and not the
Attorney General or his specially-designated Assistant Attorney
General as required by U.S.C. $ 2516.

Td. at 1202.

In rejecting

the defendant's claim, the Court reasoned that since there was
independent proof that the Attorney General did in fact approve
the application, a valid authorization had occurred.
In United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852 (1st Cir.
1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 841 (1984), the First Circuit
determined the validity of an authorisation for a wiretap under
Massachusetts law in light of Title III.

In this case, the

defendants questioned the sufficiency of the authorisation for a
wiretap because the district authority did not sign the
application.

The court determined 'that the lack of such a

document and the presumption it would enjoy is not to the
government.

The absence of a compelling signature can be

remedied by proof of actual authority.*

Id.

at 859.

In the case at bar, sufficient evidence existed to
prove that Kr. Hughes actually authorised the intercept order.
The original application named Kr. Hughes throughout as the
•••king party.

(See Br. of App. Addendum pages 11*14.)

Inherent

in the fact that Kr. Hughes personally filed the application, is

the idea that he must have also authorised it.
The Nunc Pro Tunc Order also establishes that Mr.
Hughes actually authorised the application (T. 37). The Nunc Pro
Tunc Order not only satisfies evidentiary concerns, but is a
Judicially accepted method of correcting clerical errors or
matters of form so that the record reflects actual orders or
judgments rendered by the court.

Its purpose is to "supply an

omission in the record of something really done but omitted
through mistake or inadvertence.*
(N.K. 1969).

Mora v. Martinez, 451 P.2d 992

In sum, the *[n]unc pro tunc procedure is an

instrument of truth."

Moore v. Mills, 623 S.W.2d 586, 588

(Mo.App. 1981).
However, it is not the function of a Nunc Pro Tunc
Order to change or revise a judgment or order, or set aside a
judgment actually rendered, or to render an order different from
the one actually rendered.

Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.

Corporation Commission of the State of Oklahoma, 715 P.2d 477,
478 (Okla. 1985).

The Hunc Pro Tunc procedure is available to

correct only clerical orders, not judicial errors, committed in
the rendition of judgment.

Defendant attempts to raise an ancillary issue that the
•vidence should be suppressed because the original application by
Mr. Hughes was not made on "oath of affirmation" to a judge
ursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a~10 (1986). This statute,
ike S 77-23a-8, and the previously cited case law, does not
require the county attorney's signature. Moreover, paragraph 3
of the first application incorporates by reference Sergeant Glen
Warner's attached affidavit. (See Br. of App. Addendum page 11.)
Sergeant Warner's affidavit follows all the requirement of $ 7723a-10, including the requirement of an 'oath and affirmation" to
a judge. (See Br. of App. Addendum pages 15-42.). The
application is both facially and substantively valid.

r

Courts have held that the omission of a signature or
the signing of the wrong document is a clerical error that can be
remedied by a Nunc Pro Tunc Order.

Por example, in Schmidt v.

Schmidt, 617 S.W.2d 601 (Mo.App. 1981), for example, the Missouri
Court of Appeals found that the judge's 'failure to sign a
judgment is a clerical error which can be corrected through a
Nunc Pro Tunc entry.*

16. at 603.

Similarly, in Petroleum

Equipment Financial Corp. v. First National Bank, 622 S.W.2d 152
(Tex.App. 1961), the Texas Court of Appeals allowed a Nunc Pro
Tunc Order to remedy the judge's signing of an incorrect
judgment.

In reaching this decision, the court found that the

signing of the incorrect judgment was a clerical error because it
•involved no judicial reasoning.-

16. at 154.

See also,

Feltmann v. Coutler, 528 P.2d 821 (Arit. 1974).
In the case at bar, the omission of Don Hughes'
signature is precisely the type of situation which a Nunc Pro
Tunc Order is designed to remedyi

a clerical error.

In filing

the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, Kr. Hughes did not attempt to alter or
modify Judge Wahlquist's original judgment.

In fact, the Nunc

Pro Tunc Order did not disturb the initial wiretap order, it
merely brought the court records into conformity with the truth.
Defendant attempts to discount the Nunc Pro Tunc Order
by citing to Utah State Building Board v. Wals Plumbing Co., 16
Utah 2d 249, 399 P.2d 141 (1965), which quotes Kettner v. Snow,
13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28, 29 (1962).

In Kettner, a plaintiff

failed to file within ten days of judgment a motion for a new
trial as statutorily required.

Sixty days after judgment, the

trial judge allowed the plaintiff's notion for new trial and
ordered it effective Nunc Pro Tunc as being within the first ten
days of judgment.

The Supreme Court of Utah disallowed the Nunc

Pro Tunc Order reasoning that if the court could arbitrarily
circumvent the 10-day limitation rule, "the rule would be
rendered ineffectual.-

Ld. at 30.

Kettner is not analoguous to the case at bar.

In the

present case, Kr. Hughes did not attempt to remedy inaction
through circumvention of statutory procedure.

To the contrary,

the Nunc Pro Tunc Order attempted to correct a clerical error in
an already valid Intercept Order.

Because S 77-23a-8 does not

require the County Attorney's signature, no violation of express
statutory procedure occurred.
Furthermore, courts have traditionally allowed the
introduction of independent evidence, such as affidavits, when
the question of authorisation is at issue. A scan of wiretap
cases in state and federal courts indicates that this is a common
method to determine who in fact authorised the application.

This

is allowed so that the "absence of a compelling signature on a
critical document can be remedied by proof of actual authority."
Smith, 726 F.2d at 859.
For example, the Scully court stated the following:
Appellant Sanchez contends that the
unsworn, unverified file memorandum of the
Attorney General does not meet the
government's burden of demonstrating
approval. Cj[. United States v. Chavez,
supra. But the affidavit of Sol Lindenbaua,
Assistant to the Attorney General, states
that the Attorney General approved the
application in a telephone conversation with
him. This affidavit is sworn to and is
sufficient.

Id. at 261.

Similarlyf the language of United States v. Lawson,

545 F.2d 557# 562 (7th Cir. 1975) ia compelling!
Appellants have raited the question of
whether wiretap authorizations aigned by an
acting Assistant Attorney General, not
apecifically authorired to approve electronic
surveillance under 18 U.S.C. S 2516(1), must
be auppressed as facially insufficient under
16 U.S.C. S 2581(10)(a)(ii). See notes 2 and
6 aupra.
We are not dealing with a claim that the
wiretap application was not authorized by the
Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney
General because the defendants have not
contested government affidavits indicating
that Attorney General John Mitchell himself
authorized the aurveillance. Rather, the
attack is on the facial aufficiency of the
affidavit because the authorization order was
signed by Acting Assistant Attorney General
Henry Petersen. . . .
(Emphasis in original.)

The court In Lawson refused to suppress

wiretap evidence based on the claim of facial sufficiency.
Other examples of this procedure include United States
v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974); United States v. Schullo, 363 F.Supp. 246, 253
(D.Kinn. 1973); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 222-23 (8th
Cir. 1974); and United States v. Bowdach, 366 F.Supp. 1368
(S.D.Fla. 1973).
United States v. Glordono, 416 U.S. 505 (1974),
provides the most dramatic example of the use of affidavits to
determine who in fact authorized the wiretap application.

In

Giordano, the wiretap waa facially valid in that the application
indicated approval by a specially designated Assistant Attorney
General.

However, an affidavit submitted by the Executive

Assistant to the Attorney General indicated that he, not the

specially designated person, had authorized the application.
Going behind the pleadings by use of affidavit, the Court
determined that the approval vras, in fact, by the wrong person
and suppressed the evidence.
In the case at bar, Mr. Hughes filed an affidavit as to
the existence and extent of his involvement with the
authorization of the application for the wiretap (R. 251-52).
Specifically, the affidavit states that Mr. Hughes -personally
authorized the initial application for interception on the phone
in Hunt's house and caused a pleading to be created so
indicating" and that the failure to sign the application was
•[d)ue to an oversight* (R. 252).
In light of the foregoing, there is ample evidence that
the Mr. Hughes, the Weber County Attorney, personally authorized
the initial wiretap on defendant's phone.

Since proof of actual

authority is all that is needed to validate the authorization,
the absence of his signature and was not fatal to the
application.
Defendant next contends that the original order was
facially invalid as it authorized interception for a longer
period of time than is statutorily allowed.

Defendant's

contention simply misinterprets the language of the order.
The first order, dated May 23, 1986 provides thatt
That this Order authorizing the
interception of wire (telephonic)
communications be executed as soon as
practicable commencing on 5/29/86 at 0700
hours and shall proceed until the objective
is achieved. Said objective is specifically
to include the identification of those
persons as yet unidentified and/or known, who

supply cocaine to David J. Hunt, and their
co-conspirators. This Order authorizing the
interception of wire (telephonic) upon the
initial receipt of incriminating
conversations but shall continue until enough
evidence is obtained to accomplish the
objectives herein states, but in no event
shall the authorization to intercept
communications extend longer than thirty (30)
days past 0700 hours 6/28/86 unless a
specific extension is granted by the Court
upon a finding of the Court that this is a
continuing criminal enterprise and that there
is probable cause to believe that the
communications sought to be intercepted will
continue after the initial period of
authorized interception.
(See Br. of App. Addendum pages 45-46.)
The interception was to commence at 7:00 a.m. on Kay
29, 1986 and to terminate at 7i00 a.m. on June 28, 1986.

(See

Br. of App. Addendum page 45.) The order was not intended to
continue, as defendant asserts, thirty (30) days following June
28, 1986.

Thus, Judge Wahlquist granted the wiretap for 30 days;

the statutory maximum per $ 77-23a-10(5)(a)• Therefore, the
wiretap order was facially valid and should not be voided.
Similarly, extensions of wiretap orders are available
under $ 77-23a-10(5)(b) which provides!
(b) Extensions of an order may be granted,
but only upon application for an extension
made under Subsection (1), and if the court
makes the findings required by Subsection
(2). The period of extension may be no
longer than the authorizing judge deems
necessary to achieve the purposes for which
It was granted, but in not event for longer
than 30 days.
Judge Wahlquist approved the first extension which allowing the
wiretap to continue from June 28, 1986 to July 27, 1986.

(See

Br. of App. Addendum page 62.) Again, this 30-day extension

period meets statutory limits. Judge Wahlquist authorized the
second extension to operate from July 27, 1986 to August 3, 1966.
(See Br. of App. Addendum page 79.) The wiretap ceased on August
3# 1986 (T. 32). As extensions are permissible under the Utah
Act, and in view of the fact that the wiretap did not operate
beyond the prescribed times set by Judge Wahlquist, the
extensions are valid.
POINT II
THE DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY WAS DULY AUTHORZED
TO APPLY FOR THE WIRETAP EXTENSION.
Defendant contends that the first application for
extension of the wiretap was void because it was made by a deputy
county attorney not specially designated to authorize such an
application.

As defendant did not raise this claim in the trial

court it is not properly before this court on appeal.
"In the absence of exceptional circumstances, this
court has long refused to review matters raised for the first
time on appeal where no timely and proper objection was made in
the trial court.*

State v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987).

See also, State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983).
Specifically on point, the Second Circuit in United States v.
fury, 554 P.2d 522 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 433 U.S. 910
(1977), barred a defendant from asserting the claim of
impermissible delegation of authority because the defendant
•failed to assert it in the pre-trial suppression hearing.*
at 527 n.4.

Ij3.

See also, United States v. Schwarts, 535 F.2d 160,

163 (2d. Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977).

In any event, as discussed in Point X, the issue 1B not
what is written on the pleadings, but whether the deputy was in
fact specially designated to approve the applications for wiretap
extensions.

The affidavit filed by Mr. Hughes clearly sets forth

that Kr. Hughes 'personally authorised the first application for
extension dated June 27th, 1986- and that he "specially
designated William F. Daines to review the evidence and pleadings
and authorize this application" (R. 252).
Moreover, statutes providing standards for issuance of
wiretap orders are to be interpreted "in a practical common sense
fashion to effectuate their purpose."
243 (Colo. 1984).

People v. Ingram, 684 P.2d

The approval of application for wiretap

extension dated June 27, 1986 indicates that the deputy was "a
duly authorized deputy Weber county attorney."
Addendum page 51.)

(See Br. of App.

In general pleadings, it is unnecessary for a

deputy county attorney to use this language.

A commonsense

reading of the "duly authorised" language indicates that the
deputy was authorized to do what he did, to-wit; apply for an
extension.
Defendant relies on United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S.
505 (1974), which stands for the proposition that there is a
limited class of people that may authorize an application.
Accordingly, if the application is not authorized by those
apecified individuals, the evidence is suppressed.

However, the

Giordano decision is distinguishable from the case at bar in that
* n Giordano, the facts showed that neither the attorney general
nor a specially designated assistant had in fact approved the

application.

Because the facts in this case demonstrate that Kr.

Daines was IT* fact specially designated, a valid authorization
occurred.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE
SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED.
Defendant demands that all avidence obtained from the
wiretap be suppressed on the basis that the initial wiretap
application and first extension not properly authorised.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-7 (19B6) provides that the
contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, and any
derivative evidence, may not be used at a criminal trial, or in
certain other proceedings, •if the disclosure of that information
would be violative of this chapter.-

Under the Utah Act,

aggrieved persons may move in a timely manner to suppress the use
of such evidence at trial on the grounds thatt
(i) the communication was unlawfully
intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorisation or approval
under which it was intercepted is
insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in
conformity with the order of authorisation or
approval.
Utah Code Ann. $ 77-23a-10(10(a) (1986).
Defendant demands suppression alleging that "the
communication was unlawfully intercepted.•

Utah Code Ann. S 77-

23a-10(10(a)(i) (1986).
Evidentally, defendant adopts the position that every
violation of the Utah Act, whether major or minor, ahould be
punished by suppression of the evidence obtained therefrom.
However, in analysing tha federal counterpart to tha Utah
Interception of Communication Act, tha Supreme Court opinions in

Giordano and Chavez held that not "every failure to comply fully
with any requirement provided in Title III would render the
interception of wire or oral communications 'unlawful'*. United
States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 574-75.

'To the contrary,

suppression is required only for a 'failure to satisfy any of
those statutory requirements that directly and substantially
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the
employment of this extraordinary investigation device.'"

United

States v. Donovanr 429 U.S. 413, 433-34 (1977), quoting United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. at 527.
The Donovan ca6e concerned 18 U.S.C. S 2518(1)(b)(iv),
which requires the government to identify, in its application for
a wiretap the person whose communication is to intercepted, and S
2518(8)(d), which requires in part that the issuing judge give
notice to the person whose communications were intercepted.
Donovan and two others had received proper notice under
S 2518(8)(d), but were not named in the application as required
by (l)(b)(iv).

Two other defendants were inadvertently not

listed in the notice documents and thus were not given proper
notice.

Despite these violations, the Court refused to suppress

the evidence for either violation and held that neither provision
played a central role in the overall purpose of Title III.
In People v. Wrestler, 458 N.E.2d 1348 (Ill.App. 1984),
the Court held that where there has been a technical defect in an
eavesdropping order, such a defect did not warrant the drastic
remedy of suppression.

In that case, the Judge inadvertently

authorized wiretapping for a longer period of time than was
statutorily allowed.

In rejecting the suppression motion, the

Court reasoned that the defect did "not defeat the legislative
intent of protecting the citizenry from unnecessary and prolonged
intrusion into their privates."

16. at 1352.

Although one could argue that an oral authorization
amounts to no authorization at all, notwithstanding, Congress may
have envisioned that the writing requirement would play "[n)o
role more significant than a reporting function designed to
establish on paper that one of the major procedural protections
of . . . (Title III J been accomplished."

United States v.

Chavez, 416 U.S. at 579.
In the case at bar, the omission of Mr. Hughes'
signature was a technical error, which error did not defeat a
central purpose of the Utah Act.

Defendant urges, however, that

because of Congress's announced concern over unjustified and
excessive wiretapping, the procedural provision should be
strictly construed to suppress all evidence even in the face of a
minor procedural violation.

Granting that Congress is interested

in deterring substantive excesses, not inadvertent errors, the
evidence should not be suppressed.
It may be argued that written authorization is
essential to the central purpose of the Utah Act.

Tet, implicit

in the caselaw interpreting wiretap legislation is the principle
that violations of even central requirements do not mandate
suppression if the Government demonstrates to the court's
satisfaction that the statutory purpose has been achieved despite
the violation.

For example, in United States v. Johnson, 539 F.2d 181
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977), the court
held that the Government's failure to comply with District of
Columbia's inventory requirement, D.C. Code Ann. $ 23-550, "is
not grounds for suppression if the ends of that requirement have
otherwise been achieved.*

IdL at 194.

Similarly, in United

States v. Chun, 503 F.2d 533, 542 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth
Circuit has adopted a three-part test focussing on the central
purpose of the statutory provision to whether its purpose has
been attained.
In United States v. Caqqiano, 667 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir.
1982), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while -the
sealing requirement [of the wiretap tapes] is a central or
functional safeguard to prevent abuses of the wiretap act,* . . .
•the technical noncompliance mandated suppression, however, only
if the . • • purpose of the procedure has been frustrated or the
procedure has been deliberately ignored.*

lid. at 1179.

See

also, United States v. Diana, 605 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir. 1979),
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980).
In the case at bar, the central purpose of S 77-23a-8,
the statute in question, is to *fix responsibility.*
States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 21fi.

United

By identifying the person

who authorited the application, responsibility is 'centralised in
a publlcally responsible official subject to the political
process the formulation of law enforcement policy on the use of
electronic surveillance techniques.*
Congress, 2nd Session, 96-97 (1968).

S. Rep. 1097, 90th

Notwithstanding the absence of written authorization,
the purpose of affixing public responsibility was net in thi6
case.

Responsibility was denoted in the original application

which named Mr. Hughes as the public official seeking the
application.

(See Br. of App. Addendum pages 11*14.)

Responsibility waB also affixed by the Nunc Pro Tunc Order filed
by Kr. Hughes which stated that Mr. Hughes "fully approved the
application [for a wiretap] in its final form"
Addendum pages 49-50.)

(See Br. of App.

Finally, responsibility was affixed by

the affidavit which clearly identified Mr. Hughes as "personally
authorizing the initial application for interception on the phone
in Hunt's house and caused a pleading to be created so
indicating" (R. 252).
Under these circumstances, both the overreaching
purposes of S 77-23a-8(l) ensuring uniformity and political
accountability and; (2) the more limited evidentiary function of
the vrriting requirement were clearly satisfied.

When there is no

suggestion that the Government deliberately ignored $ 77-23a~8,
and where the statutes purposes have been fully satisfied, the
suppression order should not be granted.
Defendant again relies on Giordano which stressed that
pre-application approval was essential to the central purpose of
Title III.

In Giordano, however, neither the Attorney General

nor a specifically designated assistant in fact authorised the
intercept orders. Thus, in order to comply with Title III, the
It should be noted that this Nunc Pro Tunc Order was signed by
Mr. Hughes and filed before a search warrant was Issued on
defendant's house and~before defendant was arrested.

court reasoned that the Attorney General would have had to
authorise an application "after the application is made and after
investigative officials have already begun to intercept wire or
oral communications under a court order predicated on the
assumption that proper authorization to apply for intercept
authority had been given.- 416 U.S. at n.12.

The court's concern

* n Giordano does not apply to the present case in that the County
Attorney did in fact authorize the application for the wiretap
from the outset.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
Defendant argues that defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel at trial because defense counsel failed to
properly challenge issues that were critical to the defense.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel
•it is the defendant's burden to show:

(1) that this counsel

rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and
(2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been
different but for counsel's error.*

(Footnote omitted.)

State

v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985); see also Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187,
1203-04 (Utah 1984), overruled on other grounds, 739 P.2d 628,
631 (Utah 1987) (adopting Strickland test).

Failure to show

either deficient performance or resulting prejudice will defeat a
claim of ineffective counsel.

State v. Geary, 707 P.2d at 646.

•26-

The Utah Supreme Court most recently reiterated its
adoption of the Strickland test in State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d
1019 (Utah 1987)t
Before this Court will consider whether
specific conduct falls below the required
standard of objective reasonableness, the
person arguing ineffective assistance must
show that the conduct prejudiced his case.
[Strickland, 466 U.S.) at 697# 104 S. Ct. at
2069; see also State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401,
405 (Utah 1986). In order to prove prejudice
to his case, "defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104
S. Ct. at 1028. . . .
Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023.
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective for the following reasons:

(1) he failed to file a

timely motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence; (2) he
failed to object to the sufficiency of the probable cause
statement in support of the search warrant; (3) he failed to
object to the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the
intercept order; and, (4) he failed to articulate and support his
objection to certain evidence.
As to the first two claims, defendant's claims are
inconsistent with the facts. Trial counsel in fact filed a
timely notion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the
search of defendant's home (T. 39). In the motion to suppress,
trial counsel specifically raised the issue whether the probable
cause statement was sufficient to support the search warrant (T.
39).

Defense counsel also challenged at length the sufficiency

of probable cause statement (T. 277-84).

As to the third claim dealing with trial counsel's
failure to object to the sufficiency of the intercept order
affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court ha6 stated thatt

•[djecisions

ii to . . • what objections to make • . . are generally left to
the professional judgment of counsel."
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).

State v. Medina, 738 P.2d

In State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah

1982) the Utah Supreme Court said, •[tjhis Court will not second
guess the strategy of counsel at trial.*

Malmrose, 649 P.2d at

59.
Regarding the last claim, defendant asserts that if
trial counsel's objection to the admittance of evidence was
supported by case law# the judge would have suppressed the
evidence.,

Evidentally, defendant believes that but for the lack

of supporting authority, the evidence would have been suppressed.
Since Utah Code Ann. 5 77-23a-8 and applicable case law do not
require written authorization, the failures now claimed by
defendant were not legal failures. As argued above, defendant is
not entitled to suppression of evidence on the grounds now raised
on appeal.

Thu6, trial counsel could not have been ineffective

for falling to raise the jaeritless issues now raised on appeal.
Applying the facts of this case to the test set forth
* n Strickland and followed in Frame, trial counsel's
representation did not fall below the objective standard of
reasonableness guaranteed by the Utah and United States
Constitutions.

Defendant has failed to meet his burden of

showing ineffectiveness of counsel and prejudice caused thereby.
Therefore, this Court should find that defendant was afforded a

fair trial with constitutionally sufficient representation of
counsel.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, respondent
respectfully requests this Court to affirm defendant's
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted thls^T/^^day of January,
1989.
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